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Abstract
We develop a quantum formalism (Hilbert space probabilistic cal-
culus) for measurements performed over cognitive systems. In partic-
ular, this formalism is used for mathematical modeling of the func-
tioning of consciousness as a self-measuring quantum-like system. By
using this formalism we could predict averages of cognitive observ-
ables. Reflecting the basic idea of neurophysiological and psycholog-
ical studies on a hierarchic structure of cognitive processes, we use
p-adic hierarchic trees as a mathematical model of a mental space.
We also briefly discuss the general problem of the choice of an ade-
quate mental geometry.
1 Introduction
Since the creation of quantum mechanics, there are continuous discussions
on possible connections between quantum and mental phenomena. During
the last hundred years, a huge number of various proposals and speculations
have been presented. We shall mention just a few of them.
The philosophic system of Whitehead [1]-[3] was the first attempt to
establish a quantum–mental (or more precisely mental → quantum) con-
nection. In Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism “quantum” was some
feature of basic protomental elements of reality, namely actual occasions, see
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[1], especially p. 401-403. See also A. Shimony [4] for modern reconsider-
ation of quantum counterpart of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. It is
especially important for us to underline that all protomental elements of re-
ality have quantum temporal structure: “The actual entity is the enjoyment of
a certain quantum of physical time.” – [1], p. 401.
The extended discussion on quantum–mental connection was induced by
attempts to solve the problem of quantum measurements, see e.g. [5]-[12].
The most extreme point of view is that physical reality is, in fact, created by
acts of observations. This kind of considerations is especially closely related
to the so called orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.1
By this interpretation a wave function provides the complete description of
an individual quantum system. An act of measurement induces collapse of
the wave function. The problem of measurement is still unsolved within a
quantum framework (at least on the basis of the conventional interpretation
of quantum mechanics, see also section 10). Among various attempts to pro-
vide a reasonable explanation of wave function reduction, one should mention
attempts to use consciousness as the determining factor of reductions of wave
functions, see e.g. Wigner [8].
There were also various attempts reduce an act of thinking to quantum
collapse, see e.g. Orlov [13] (quantum logic of consciousness); see also Pen-
rose [14], [15]: “I am speculating that the action of conscious thinking is very
much tied up with the resolving out of alternatives that were previously in linear
superposition.”
In fact, Penrose worked in the reductionist approach, see e.g. [16] (and
compare e.g. [17]-[20]): It seems we could not reduce cognitive phenomena
to the physical activity of neurons. It might be that we could reduce it to
activity of quantum systems. Roughly speaking an act of thinking is reduced
to the collapse of a wave function in quantum gravity. Our thinking ability
is based on collapses of superpositions of two mass states.
The idea of quantum-physical reduction for cognitive processes is quite
popular within the quantum community. We also mention the investiga-
tions of H. Stapp [21] who used the Copenhagen (Heisenberg-potentiality)
approach to quantum mechanics. He also used a quantum reductionist ap-
proach: “Brain processes involve chemical processes and hence must, in principle,
be treated quantum mechanically.” We should also mention quantum field re-
ductionist models, by Jibu and Yasue [22], [23] (based on Umezawa [24]),
Vitiello et el. [25]. These quantum field models look more attractive (al
least for me). At the moment there is no idea how make the great jump
1We mention Berkeley’s idealism as one of sources for such a point of view to physical
reality.
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from individual gravitational collapses to global acts of cognition. Quantum
field models are more useful to provide such a global structure connecting
individual quantum collapses to global acts of thinking.
However, it seems that reductionism as the general methodology of study-
ing the brain is less and less popular in cognitive sciences. After the period of
large hopes associated with new possibilities to study neuronal firings, there
is strong disillusionment in the possibility of some physical reduction of men-
tal processes. This is one reason for the quite strong critical attitude against
quantum models in cognitive sciences. In the extreme form this criticism is
expressed in the following form:
”The only common thing between quantum and mental is that we have no
idea how to understand any of these phenomena.”
Another thing that induces prejudice against quantum-reduction theories
among neurophysiologists is that a quantum micro description contains many
parameters that are far from magnitudes of corresponding brain’s parame-
ters (e.g. temperature, time scale and so on). Thus creators of all quantum
reductionist models of brain’s functioning become immediately involved in
hard battles with these parameters (e.g. high temperature of brain). Of
course, it may be that all these parameter-problems are just technical tem-
porary problems. It may be that in future even the decoherence problem, see,
for example, [15], would be solved. Nevertheless, there are doubts about the
possibility of the direct application of quantum physical theory to cognitive
phenomena.
My personal critical attitude with respect to traditional quantum cogni-
tive models is merely based on absence of a realistic bio-physical model that
would explain the transition from quantum processes in the microworld to
cognitive processes. Of course, apart from the plethora of theoretical mod-
els such that proposed by Hameroff, Nanopoulos, Mavromatos, Mershin and
many others there are also very concrete experimental papers such as those
by Wolf pertaining to exactly that point (see section 10 for the details). Nev-
ertheless, at the moment we still do not have a transition model that would
be accepted by majority of neurophysiologists and psychologists. 2
2On one hand, absence of such a realistic bio-physical model could be simply a con-
sequence of the huge complexity of this problem. If it is really the case, then we could
expect that in the future such a model would be finally created. On the other hand, it
might occur that such a model does not exist at all, since it might be that cognition is
not generated by quantum processing of information in the microworld. As we have al-
ready mentioned, the latter view has become very popular over the last years. So absence
of a realistic transition model has become a dangerous problem for the whole quantum
cognition enterprise. My personal position on the possibility of quantum reduction is
based on quantum as well as neurophysiological experience. On one hand, I totally agree
with neurophysiologists that there are very strong arguments that cognitive information
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Finally, we discuss the holistic approach to cognitive phenomena based on
Bohmian-Hiley-Pylkka¨nen theory of active information. By considering the
pilot wave as a kind of information field they presented interesting models
of cognitive processes, see [26]-[28], see also author’s work [29]. In the latter
paper there was proposed a mathematical model of field of consciousness.
This field is not defined on physical space-time. This is a pure information
structure. In principle, such a field can be considered as a mathematical
representation of Whitehead’s field of feeling [1].
Consciousness-information models also were developed in books of M.
Lockwood [30], and J. A. Barrett [31] (who use a many-minds version of
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics) and in the author’s paper
[32] devoted to quantum information reality.
Over the last few years I tried to split, see [33]-[36], the quantum formal-
ism into two more or less independent parts:
1) really quantum (quanta, Planck constant, discreteness);
2) Hilbert space probabilistic formalism.
Pioneer investigations of M. Planck and A. Einstein on foundations of
quantum theory (black body radiation and photoelectric effect) were merely
investigations on discreteness (quantization) of energy. Quantum probabilis-
tic (Hilbert space) formalism was developed later (Born, Jordan, Heisenberg,
Dirac [37]-[38]). It was created to describe statistics of elementary particles.
Due to such a historical origin, the Hilbert space probabilistic calculus is
always related to processes in the microworld.
However, careful analysis, [33]-[36], demonstrated that Hilbert space prob-
abilistic calculus (Born, Jordan, Heisenberg, Dirac, see e.g. [37]-[38]) is
a purely mathematical formalism that gives the possibility to work with
context–dependent probabilities, i.e., probabilities depending on complexes
of physical conditions (contexts) related to concrete measurements. There-
fore we could apply the Hilbert space probabilistic formalism, quantum-like
formalism, not only to the description of statistical micro phenomena, but
also to various phenomena outside micro world. One of such possibilities
is to apply quantum-like formalism to describe statistical experiments with
is prossesed on neuronal macro-level. On the other hand, I am strongly impressed by the
idea of interference of cognitive information proposed by quantum physicists (e.g. Orlov,
Penrose, Stapp, Hameroff and many others). I would like to explore this idea and at the
same time escape the problem of transition from quantum processes in the microworld to
cognitive processes. I use the probabilistic calculus of quantum formalism (Hilbert space
formalism) to describe probabilistic amplitude thinking. In particular, in such a model,
the brain would be able to create ‘interference of minds.’ However, in my model elemen-
tary units of processing of cognitive information are macroscopic neuronal structures and
not quantum micro systems.
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cognitive systems. Here a quantum-like formalism describes probabilistic
distributions depending on neural, cognitive and social contexts.
Such an approach has no (at least direct) relation to reductionist quan-
tum models. We are not interested in statistical behaviour of micro systems
forming a macro system, the brain. Therefore this approach does not induce
such a problem as the transition from micro to macro (temperature, deco-
herence and so on). We just use the Hilbert space probabilistic formalism
to describe cognitive measurements. As in the ordinary quantum formalism,
mental observables are realized as symmetric operators in the Hilbert space of
square integrable functions φ(q) depending on the mental state q of a cogni-
tive system. By using the Hilbert space scalar product we calculate averages
of mental observables. Of course, this cognitive model is a purely statistical
one. It could not provide a description of individual thought-trajectories.
One of the reasons for using quantum-like formalism to describe statis-
tics of measurements over cognitive systems is that cognitive systems (as
well as quantum) are very sensitive to changes of contexts of experiments -
complexes of physical and mental conditions ([33]-[36], compare to Heisen-
berg [38] or Dirac [37]). Quantum-like formalism might be used to describe
external measurements (in neurophysiology, psychology, cognitive and social
sciences) over ensembles of cognitive systems or neural ensembles in a sin-
gle brain.3 As well as in quantum experiments with elementary particles,
preparation of a statistical ensemble (of rats or people) plays the crucial
role in cognitive measurements. Thus, as in ordinary quantum theory, it is
meaningless to speak about a measurement without specifying a preparation
procedure preceding this measurement. In cognitive sciences we also should
follow Bohr’s recommendation to take into account the whole experimental
arrangement. The main experimental evidence of quantum-like structure of
statistical data obtained in neurophysiology, psychology, cognitive and social
sciences should be interference of probabilities, see [33]-[36] and section 10.
Moreover, our quantum-like formalism can be used not only for describing
external cognitive experiments, but also modeling of mentality. The basic as-
sumption of our model is that the brain has the ability to “feel” probabilistic
amplitude φ(q) of information states produced by hierarchic neural pathways
in brain (and the whole body). There is also a model of consciousness that
creates its context by performing self-measurements over extremely sensitive
neural contexts.
One of the fundamental problems in foundations of cognitive quantum-
like formalism is the choice of a mathematical model for a mental configura-
3Thus we extend to cognitive sciences Heisenberg’s viewpoint to the role of disturbances
in producing of quantum interference.
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tion space on which a wave function is defined. We shall discuss this problem
in the details in section 2. We now only remark that the Euclidean physical
space (within which the physical brain is located) does not look attractive
as a model of mental space. Instead of this conventional model of space, we
develop cognitive quantum-like formalism on the space of information strings
that could be performed by chains of hierarchically ordered neurons. Such a
configuration space is geometrically represented by a hierarchic p-adic tree.
In fact, this idea was already discussed in the authors’s paper [32] (see also
[39]-[44]). However, in [32] we did not use the standard Hilbert space for-
malism. We used a generalization of quantum probabilistic calculus based
on p-adic probabilities. In the present paper we use the standard Hilbert
space formalism on p-adic trees. In fact, the mathematical formalism of
p-adic quantum mechanics is well developed, see Vladimirov, Volovich, Ze-
lenov [45], [46], see also [47]. We ”simply” apply this formalism to cognitive
phenomena.
In the ordinary quantum mechanics, we could go beyond the statistical
application of quantum formalism. One of the most attractive possibilities
is to use the pilot wave Bohmian formalism. As we have already remarked,
the idea to use Bohmian mechanics in cognitive sciences was already well
discussed (Bohm-Hiley-Pilkka¨nen [26]-[28] and author [29]). It is rather sur-
prising that it seems to be impossible to create a variant of the pilot wave ex-
tension of quantum-like mental formalism presented in this paper. Formally
we can introduce quantum-like mental potential and force. However, there is
no possibility to derive the equation of motion (a kind of Newton equation)
that would describe trajectories of individual mental states (describe ”flows
of mind”). In our formalism, this is a consequence of the mathematical struc-
ture of the model. However, it may be that there are some deep cognitive
features behind this mathematical result.
We start with some preliminary considerations on the choice of the ge-
ometry of a mental space.
2 Where is consciousness located?
The problem of location (or nonlocality) of consciousness (as well as more
primitive cognitive processes) is widely discussed in philosophic, neurophysi-
ological and psychological literature, see e.g. [48]-[56]. There is large variety
of views starting with such a primary question:
‘Is consciousness located in human brain?’
Both philosophic and neurophysiological discussions are, in fact, related
to one fixed geometry, namely the Euclidean one. It seems that such an
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approach was originated (at least in philosophy) by Kant [55]. For him, the
space was the absolute Euclidean space. He also pointed out that the idea
of space is the primary idea. Nothing could be even imagine without any
relation to space. Since Kantian space is identified with the Euclidean space,
we have to look for a place of consciousness in this space. It seems that
this is the starting point of the main stream of modern philosophic, neuro-
physiological and psychological investigations. However, despite enormous
efforts to find the place of consciousness, there is more and more evidence
that consciousness cannot be located in physical space. What is wrong? I
think the choice of geometry. I think that the use of the Euclidean geometry
is not adequate to this problem.
In fact, the idea that different natural phenomena are in general de-
scribed by using different geometries is well established in physics, especially
general relativity and string theory. Following Chalmers [56], we consider
consciousness as a kind of natural phenomenon. First we must find an ad-
equate model of a mental space. Then we get the possibility to describe
cognitive (and conscious) phenomena. Let us imagine that we would like to
describe electromagnetic processes without using a mathematical model of
the electromagnetic field distributed on the Euclidean space. This seems to
be impossible. 4
We have already mentioned the use of various geometries in general in
physics, e.g. in general relativity and string theory. However, these mod-
els are mainly locally-Euclidean (Euclidean manifolds).5 The use of such
manifolds could not solve the problem of cognitive nonlocality (in particular,
nonlocality of psychological functions). One of possibilities is to proceed in a
quantum-like way and use noncommutative mental coordinates, see B. Hiley
[28]. Another possibility is to try to find a model of classical mental configu-
ration space (probably as the basis of a quantum-like model). Since [39]-[46],
we use a purely information model of mental space, namely the space of all
possible information strings that could be produced by hierarchically ordered
chains of neurons. One of the simplest models of such a space is a hierar-
chic (homogeneous) p-adic tree Zp, where p is a natural number. It gives
the number of branches leaving each vertex of this tree. We remark that in
mathematical models p is typically a prime number, see [45], [47]. But this
4Sometimes (especially in philosophy) one uses the expression “ to explain conscious-
ness”. I do not think that we can “explain” it. In the same way we can not “explain”, e.
g., the electromagnetic field. We can only describe mathematically and understand it via
such a description, compare to Penrose [15], p. 419.
5Even the use of superspace in superstring theory as well as in superfield theory cannot
be considered as a fundamental change of geometry. Locally, superspace is still a real
continuous manifold, see e.g. [57] for the details.
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is not so important for our cognitive considerations.
3 Classical mental states produced by one-
layer brain
3.1. p-adic coding. We consider the simplest hierarchic “brain” consisting
of just one hierarchic chain of neurons :
N = (n0, n1, ..., nN , ...).
In a mathematical model it is convenient to consider an infinite chain.
In the simplest model each neuron can perform only one of two states:
αj = 1 (firing) and αj = 0 (off).
In more complex models each neuron nj can perform p different levels of
activation: αj = 0, 1, ..., p−1. For example, such a coding can be obtained by
using frequencies of firing of neurons as basic elements of coding. Frequencies
of firing are a better basis for the description of processing of information
by neurons than simple on/off. This has been shown to be the fundamental
element of neuronal communication in a huge number of experimental neu-
rophysiological studies (see e.g. [58], [59] on mathematical modeling of brain
functioning in the frequency domain approach).
One of possible p-adic coding models is the following one. A p-adic
structure associated with frequency coding is generated in the following way.
There exists some interval (of physical time) ∆ (unit of “mental time”, see
section 10 for further consideration). Then αj is equal to the number of
oscillations of the neuron nj (in the hierarchic chain N ) that are performed
during the interval ∆. Here p− 1 (where p = p∆) is the maximally possible
number of oscillations during the period ∆ that can be performed by neu-
rons in the chain N . Thus in our model the p-adic structure of the brain of a
cognitive system τ (that uses a frequency neural code) is related to the time
scale of the functioning of the brain, see also section 10.
We must mention one mathematical fact that may be have some cognitive
interpretation. The case p = 2 is a very exceptional one in p-adic analysis,
see e.g. [45], [47]. We can speculate that the transition from 2-adic coding
(firing/off) to more complex p-adic, p > 3, coding (e.g. frequency coding)
was the evolutionary jump. Cognitive systems in the p-adic model exhibit
essentially richer mental behaviour in the case p > 2 than in the case p = 2,
see [47], [39]-[44] on classical mental dynamics.
3.2. Hierarchy and ultrametricity. It is supposed that neurons in a
layer N are hierarchically ordered: n0 is the most important (igniting), n1 is
less important and so on. The N is able to produce information strings of
the form:
x = (x0, x1, ..., xN , ...), xj = 0, 1, ..., p− 1.
We denote the set of all such strings by the symbol Zp. The hierarchic struc-
ture in the chain N induces a tree representation of Zp. Information strings
are represented by branches of such a tree.
♠⋆
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✯
♠0 ❳❳❳❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✘
✘✘✿
♠1 ❳❳❳❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✘
✘✘✿
♠0
♠1
♠0
♠1
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
Figure 1: The 2-adic tree
The distance between two branches, x and y, is defined in the following way.
Let l be the length of the common root of these branches. Then the p-adic
distance between x and y is defined as
ρp(x, y) =
1
pl
.
Thus if x = (xj) and y = (yj) and x0 = y0, ..., xl−1 = yl−1, but xl 6= yl, then
ρp(x, y) =
1
pl
. This is a metric on the set of branches Zp of the p-adic tree.
Two branches are close with respect to this metric if they have a sufficiently
long common root. We remark that Zp is complete with respect to the p-adic
metric ρp.
The p-adic metric gives a topological representation of the hierarchic
structure in neural chains. The distance between information strings x and
y approaches the maximal value ρp(x, y) = 1 if x0 6= y0. Thus the state (e.g.
the frequency of firing) of the first neuron n0 in a hierarchic chain N plays
the most important role. States xj of neurons nj, where j → ∞, have a
practically negligible contribution into the geometry of the p-adic space.
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The p-adic metric is a so called ultrametric, i.e., it satisfies the strong
triangle inequality:
ρp(x, y) ≤ max[ρp(x, z), ρp(z, y)], x, y, z ∈ Zp.
The strong triangle inequality can be stated geometrically: each side of a
triangle is at most as long as the longest one of the two other sides. This
property implies that all triangles are isosceles. Ultrametricity is a very
important feature of p-adic geometry. In fact, ultrametricity is the exhibition
of hierarchy. Recently it was proved in general topology that in general case
ultrametricity induces a treelike representation and vice versa, see [60]. In
many particular cases such a relation between ultrametricity and hierarchy
was used in theory of spin glasses, see e.g. [61]-[63].
There exists a natural algebraic structure on this tree: addition, sub-
traction and multiplication of branches. It is based on the representation of
information strings by so called p-adic numbers:
x = x0 + x1p+ ... + xNp
N + ...
This is the ring of p-adic integers. In particular, this is a compact additive
group. Thus there exists the Haar measure dx (an analogue of the ordinary
linear measure on the straight line).
We set Br(a) = {x ∈ Zp : ρp(x, a) ≤ r} and Sr(a) = {x ∈ Zp : ρp(x, a) =
r}, where r = 1/pj, j = 0, 1, 2, ... and a ∈ Zp. These are, respectively, balls
and spheres in the metric space Zp. In particular, Zp = B1(0). Each ball has
the structure of the homogeneous p-adic tree (scaling of the basic tree given
by Zp).
As in every ulrametric space, all these sets (balls and spheres) have a
topological structure which seems to be rather strange from the point of
view of our Euclidean intuition: they are open and closed at the same time.
Such sets are called clopen. Another interesting property of p-adic balls is
that two balls have nonempty intersection iff one of these balls is contained
in another. Finally we note that any point of the p-adic ball can be chosen
as its center. Thus the ball is not characterized by its center and radius.
3.3. Mental space. We choose the space Q = Zp as a mental configu-
ration space. Points q ∈ Q are called mental classical-like states (or simply
mental states) or mental positions.
Thus a mental state q ∈ Q describes activity of neurons in a hierarchi-
cally ordered chain of neurons. This is a kind of information state. Such a
state could not be considered simply as the representation of physical (elec-
tro – chemical) activity of neurons in a chain. There are two information
parameters that play important roles in our model.
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First there is the hierarchic structure in a neural chain. Neurons in a
chain “do not have equal rights.” The igniting neuron n0 is the bandmaster
of the orchestra N . This orchestra is rigidly hierarchic. The next neuron n1
in the N is less important than n0 and so on. I think that the presence of
such a hierarchy plays an important role in creation of cognition and may be
even consciousness.
Another information parameter is a natural number p that determines the
coding system of (one layer) brain N . If we follow to the frequency approach
to functioning of neural networks in brain, then the parameter p gives the
maximal number of oscillation for a neuron in a chain N during the unit
interval ∆ of mental time. The ∆ is an interval of physical time that in our
model determines the neural code of N , see section 10.
In our model a mental state provides only cognitive representation and
not the contents of consciousness. All unconscious processes are performed
on the level of mental states. We remark that in a multi-layer brain, see
section 5.1, various unconscious cognitive processes can be performed par-
allely. Nonlinear dynamical models of such processes were studied in [47],
[39]-[44]. One of the distinguishing features of p-adic nonlinear dynamics is
the absence of chaotic behaviour. In general p-adic dynamical systems are
essentially more regular than real ones. Moreover, they are very stable with
respect to random perturbations (in particular, noises), [43]. Typically a
p-adic random dynamical system has only deterministic attractors, see [43].
We remark that dynamics in spaces of p-adic numbers depends crucially on
the parameter p (determining the neural code of a brain N ). As it was dis-
covered in [47], the same dynamical system (e.g. given by a monomial xn)
can demonstrate completely different behaviours for e.g. p = 2, or p = 3, or
p = 1999, ....
We are now going to consider a quantum-like model based on the p-
adic mental configuration space Q = Zp. In particular, this model might be
used to describe the transition from unconscious representation of cognitive
information to conscious one.
4 Quantum-like formalism for one layer brain
4.1. Hilbert space probabilistic formalism for mental observables.
We consider the space of square integrable functions L2(Q, dx), where Q =
Zp :
φ : Zp → C, ‖φ‖2 =
∫
Zp
|φ(x)|2dx <∞.
The space H = L2(Q, dx) is chosen as the space of mental quantum-like states
11
(or mental amplitudes). These states are represented by normalized vectors
φ ∈ H : ‖φ‖ = 1. The H is a complex Hilbert space with scalar product
(φ, ψ) =
∫
Q
φ(x)ψ¯(x)dx . (1)
Mental observables are realized as self-adjoint operators A : H → H. As in
the ordinary quantum formalism, by fixing a quantum-like state φ ∈ H in
general we do not fix the concrete value A = λ of a mental observable A. It
is only possible to find the average of A in the state φ :
< A >φ=
∫
Q
A(φ)(x)φ¯(x) dx . (2)
However, if φ ∈ H is an eigenfunction of A corresponding to the eigenvalue
λ, i.e., Aφ = λφ, then we can be sure that we shall obtain the value A = λ
with probability 1.
The concrete representations of mental observables by self-adjoint opera-
tors is a very important and nontrivial problem. This problem could not be
solved by trivial generalization of an ordinary quantum formalism. We start
with this surprising remark: it seems to be impossible to define mental posi-
tion, q, observable. Formally the difficulty is purely mathematical: we could
not multiply a p-adic number q ∈ Q with a complex number φ(q). There-
fore the standard Schro¨dinger’s definition of the position operator could not
be generalized to the cognitive case. Of course, we could try to find some
mathematical tricky (”non natural”) definitions of mental position operator.
However, it might be that this mathematical difficulty is evidence of some
important feature of cognitive systems. It might be that:
Even in principle it is impossible to measure mental states Q of brain.
In particular, we could not prepare a statistical ensemble of brains having
the fixed mental state (there are no mental state eigenfunctions).
We can only find the probability that a mental state q belongs to some
(measurable) subset O of the mental space Q : P (q ∈ O) = ∫O |φ(x)|2dx.
Example 4.1. Let us consider the quantum like state φ ≡ 1 (the uniform
probability distribution of mental states). Then P (q ∈ Br(a)) = r. Thus (as
it could be expected) the probability to find this cognitive system in the
mental state q belonging to a small ball around any fixed point a is small.
4.2. External mental measurements. An important class of mental
observables is given by measurements that are performed by external sys-
tems over a cognitive system τ. In particular, in section 6 we shall introduce
a neuron-activation observable that arises naturally in neurophysiological
measurements. Besides neurophysiological mental observables, we can con-
sider e.g. psychological or social mental observables. In experiments with
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people such a mental observable A can be given just by a question A. Here
A takes two values: A = 1, yes, and A = 0, no. In experiments with animals
values of A give possible reactions of animals to experimental conditions. In
principle an external system that performs a measurement over a cognitive
system τ need not be conscious nor even cognitive. It can be, for example, a
magnetic resonance device performing a measurement of neural activity. 6
4.3. Consciousness. I would not like to reduce mental measurements
to external measurements. It is natural to try to describe consciousness as
a continuous flow of mental self-measurements. 7 The idea that cognitive
representation of information in the brain becomes conscious in the process
of self-measurements is not so new, see e.g. Orlov [13] for a quantum logic
model of self-measuring consciousness: “... the volitional act of a free choice
plays in this theory a role analogous to the role of the measurement act in quan-
tum mechanics (with the important difference that the brain “measures” itself).
Consciousness is a system which observes itself and evaluates itself – being aware,
at the same time, of doing so.”
The crucial point of our consideration is that we use a quantum-like ideol-
ogy, instead of the traditional quantum one. In our model the configuration
space is the state space of macroscopic neural networks. Thus we need not
go deeply into the microworld to find the origin of consciousness (e.g. no col-
lapses of mass-superpositions and so on). So we need not apply to quantum
gravity (or even superstring theory).
In our model it is supposed that each cognitive system τ developed the
ability to feel the probability distribution P (q) of realization of the hierarchic
information string q by its neural system. Such an ability is basically trans-
ferred from generation to generation. However, for each τ it is permanently
developed in the process of brain’s functioning. This probability distribution
P (q) has an amplitude φ(q) that can be mathematically described by a nor-
malized vector in the Hilbert space H = L2(Q, dx). As usual, P (q) = |φ(q)|2.
As was already discussed, the appearance of the quantum-like probabilis-
tic formalism (instead of classical Kolmogorov probabilistic formalism) is a
general consequence of sensibility of P (q) to changes in the neural context.
Here
φ(q) =
√
P (q)eiθ(q).
Here θ(q) is a phase parameter. It appears automatically in transformation
of probabilities from one mental representation (see 5.4) to another, see [33]-
[36]. We shall illustrate the role of θ(q) on the example of transition from
6Such a viewpoint induces some difficulties, see, for example, Wigner [8] on the role of
consciousness in quantum measurements.
7“Continuous” has the meaning of mental time continuity, see section 10.
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mental-position to motivation representation, section 5.4.
In our model “feeling” of the probability distribution is performed on an
unconscious level. In particular a cognitive system does not feel consciously
the evolution of the mental amplitude φ(t, q).
Moreover, we suppose that each conscious cognitive system τ has the
ability to perform self-measurements. Results of these measurements form
the contexts of consciousness. I do not try to develop such a model of con-
sciousness in the present paper. The main aim of this paper was to present
quantum-like formalism corresponding to hierarchic neural networks. In prin-
ciple, the reader can use only a restricted viewpoint of mental observables as
external measurements over cognitive systems. We just consider a possible
scheme of functioning of such a (quantum-like) self-measuring consciousness.
4.4. Random dynamical quantum-like consciousness. Let us de-
note the set of all operators representing mental observables participating in
the creation of the contents of consciousness by the symbol Lcons(H). Let us
consider a random dynamical system (RDS: see, for example, [64] for gen-
eral theory) that at each instant of (mental) time chooses randomly some set
of commutative operators A1, ..., Am ∈ Lcons(H). The contents of conscious-
ness at this instant of time is created by the simultaneous measurement of
A1, ..., Am.
One of the main distinguishing features of the RDS-model is that a RDS
in the space of mental observables can have long range memory. Such a
feature of RDS is very important to create a realistic mathematical model
of functioning of consciousness. Our consciousness does not consist of dis-
crete moments but there is flow of consciousness. We remember something
about our earlier conscious experiences, see e.g Whitehead’s analysis of this
problem [1], p. 342-343: “Whenever there is consciousness there is some element
of recollection. It recalls earlier phases from the dim recesses of the unconscious.
Long ago this truth was asserted in Plato doctrine of reminiscence. No doubt
Plato was directly thinking of glimpses of eternal truths lingering in a soul deriva-
tive from timeless heaven of pure form. Be that as it may, then in a wider sense
consciousness enlightens experience which precedes it, and could be without it if
considered as a mere datum. Hume, with opposite limitations to his meaning,
asserts the same doctrine....But the immediate point is the deep-seated alliance of
consciousness with recollection both for Plato and fo Hume.”
5 Motivation observable
5.1. Multi-layers hierarchic brain. To consider nontrivial examples
of mental observables, it is convenient to study a ”brain” having a more
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complex mental space. Such a brain consists of a few hierarchic p-adic trees.
We consider a layer of neurons
N = (..., nk, ..., n0, ..., nl, ...)
that goes in both directions (in the mathematical model it is infinite in both
directions). Each neuron nj, j = 0,±1,±2, ..., can be the igniting neuron
for right hand side hierarchic chain: Nj = (nj, ...., nl, ...). The corresponding
mental space Z(j) consists of all information strings
x = (xj , xj+1, ..., xl, ...), xl = 0, 1, ..., p− 1
(in particular, Zp = Z
(0)). Each space has the structure of the homogeneous
p-adic tree. These spaces are ordered by inclusion: Z(j+1) ⊂ Z(j). We con-
sider union of all these space Qp = ∪∞j=−∞Z(j). Geometrically this space is
represented as a huge collection of trees ordered by the inclusion relation.
On this space we can introduce the structure of ring: addition, subtraction
and multiplication of branches of trees. If the coding parameter p is a prime
number (i.e., p = 2, 5, 7, ..., 1997, 1999, ...), then Qp is a field, i.e., division
of branches also is well defined. In this case Qp is a number field (of p-adic
numbers). Arithmetical operations are performed by using p-adic number
representation of branches:
x =
∞∑
i=j
xip
i, j = 0,±1,±2, ... (3)
Metric on Qp is defined in the same way as on Zp. In particular, each tree
Z(j) coincides with a p-adic ball Br(0), where r = 1/p
j. We shall also use
p-adic absolute value: |x|p = ρp(x, 0). To calculate it, we have to find in the
chain N the first (from the left hand side) firing neuron nj (xj 6= 0, but
xl = 0 for all l < j) and set |x|p = 1/pj.
The Qp is a locally compact field. Hence, there also exists the Haar
measure dx.
We now choose Q = Qp as a model of a mental configuration space;
consider the Hilbert H = L2(Q, dx) of square integrable functions φ : Q→ C
as the space of quantum-like mental states.
5.2. Motivation magnitude observable. It would be interesting
to consider the following quantity (more precisely, qualia): motivation ξ
to change the mental state q. Unfortunately, for the same reasons as for
the mental state observable we could not introduce a motivation observable.
However, we can introduce an observable Mξ that will give the magnitude of
a motivation. It is impossible to prepare a brain with the fixed motivation ξ,
15
but we could prepare a brain with the fixed amplitude of a motivation (that
gives a measure of motivation’s strength). Such Mξ must be a kind of deriva-
tive with respect to the mental state (coordinate) q. Such a generalization of
derivative is given by Vladimirov’s operator D, see [45], defined with the aid
of the p-adic Fourier transform.8
p-adic Fourier transform:
φ˜(ξ) =
∫
Q
φ(x)e(ξx)dx, ξ ∈ Q,
where e is a p-adic character (an analogue of exponent): e(ξx) = e2pii{ξx}.
Here, for a p-adic number a, {a} denotes its fractional part, i.e., for a =
a
−m
pm
+ ...+ a−1
p
+ a0 + ...+ akp
k + ... (where aj = 0, 1, ..., p− 1, and a−m 6= 0)
we have
{a} = a−m
pm
+ ...+
a−1
p
.
Vladimirov’s operator of order α > 0 is defined as
Dα(φ)(x) =
∫
Q
|ξ|αφ˜(ξ)e(−ξx)dξ.
We remark that DαDβ = Dα+β. We define the motivation magnitude ob-
servable M as
Mξ = hD
Here h = 1
pm
is some normalization constant. The h plays the role of
the Planck constant in ordinary quantum mechanics. At the moment it is
not clear: “Can we expect that there exists a kind of universal constant
h, the mental Planck constant?” I am quite sceptical that such a universal
normalization constant really exists. It is more natural to suppose that h
would depend on a class of cognitive systems under consideration. In fact,
by finding h (the level of motivation discretization) we find the basis p of the
coding system.
To calculate averages of the momentum magnitude operator Mξ for dif-
ferent quantum-like mental states, it is natural to use the Fourier transform.
By analogy with ordinary quantum mechanics we could say: to move from
position to momentum representation.
Example 5.1. Let a quantum-like state φ is such that its Fourier trans-
form φ˜(ξ) is uniformly distributed over the ball Br(0), r = 1/p
l. Here
< Mξ >φ= p
l
∫
Br(0)
|ξ|pdξ = 1
pl−1(p+ 1)
.
8We remark that it is impossible to define the derivative for maps from Qp to R, see
[47].
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5.3. Wholeness of mental observables. It is important to remark
that (in the opposite to the ordinary quantum momentum) theMξ is nonlocal
operator. It can be represented as an integral operator, see [45]:
D(φ)(x) =
p2
p+ 1
∫
Q
φ(x)− φ(y)
|x− y|2p
dy .
To find Mξ(φ)(x) in some fixed point x, we have to take into account values
of φ in all points of the mental configuration space. Thus motivation psycho-
logical function can not be localized in some particular neural substructure
of brain.
This example is a good illustration of the mathematical description of
nonlocality of psychological functions in our p-adic quantum-like model. One
of the main distinguishing features of this model is nonlocality of derivation
operator (Vladimirov’s operator). Hence the corresponding psychological
function is produced by the whole neural system of the body (as indivisible
system).
5.4. Psychological functions as quantum-like representations.
The mathematical description of the motivation psychological function by
using a new representation in the Hilbert state space is the basic exam-
ple that can be generalized to describe all possible psychological functions.
We remark that the motivation representation is, in fact, a new system of
quantum-like mental coordinates. In the case of motivation a new system of
coordinates was generated by a unitary operator in the Hilbert state space,
namely Fourier transform.
In the general case each psychological function F is represented math-
ematically by choosing a system of coordinates in the Hilbert state space,
mental representation. Thus we can identify the set of all psychological func-
tions with the set of all unitary operators: U → FU and F → UF . All mental
observables A represented by self-adjoint operators that can be diagonalized
by using the concrete U -representation can be related to the corresponding
psychological function FU . For example, concerning visual function observ-
ables of shape and colour can be diagonalized in the visual representation of
the state Hilbert space.
In such a model all psychological functions coexist peacefully in the neural
system. The evolution of the quantum-like mental state φ(t, x) (see section
9) induces the simultaneous evolutions of all mental functions (in this state).
This is unconscious evolution. Thus a conscious system τ are not consciously
aware about simultaneous evolution of the various psychological functions.
Only by the acts of self-measurements of some mental observables A
(j)
F that
are diagonal in the F -representation the τ becomes aware about some features
of the corresponding psychological function F.
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5.5. Free mental waves. We remark that Vladimirov’s operator D has
a system of (generalized) eigenfunctions that is similar to the system of free-
wave eigenfunctions in ordinary quantum mechanics, where φξ(x) = e
iξx/h
corresponds to the fixed value ξ of momentum. In the mental framework:
Mξe(hξx) = |ξ|pe(hξx).
Here we have used the fact [45]: De(ξx) = |ξ|pe(ξx). We remark that in
the ordinary quantum formalism the h is placed in denominator, ξx/h, and
in the p-adic quantum formalism it is placed in the nominator, hξx. This is
a consequence of the fact that 1/h is large in R and h is large in Qp.
The function φξ(x) = e(hξx) is a kind of free mental wave corresponding
to the fixed value ξ of the motivation. As |φξ(x)| = 1 for all x ∈ Q, the
probability to find a cognitive system in the mental state x does not depend
on x. By analogy with the ordinary quantum mechanics we would like to
interpret this mathematical fact in the following way: By fixing the mag-
nitude of motivation (strength of willing) we could not localize the mental
state. However, we will see soon that such an analogy (between material and
mental states) can not be used.
A free mental wave φξ gives a good example illustrating of the role of the
phase θ(x) of the mental amplitude. Here we have
θ(x) = 2π{ξx}. (4)
Thus if a cognitive system τ has the fixed motivation ξ and the mental
probability distribution P (x) is uniform, then the phase of the corresponding
mental amplitude is determined by (4). Thus in general the phase θ(x) of
a mental amplitude φ(x) is not the pure product of neural activity. This
phase contains information on the transition from one mental representation
to another.
5.6. Privacy of motivation states. The wave φξ(x) is not determined
uniquely by the observable Mξ. The main distinguishing feature of p-adic
quantum mechanics (discovered by Vladimirov, [45]) is the huge degenera-
tion of the spectrum of the momentum and energy operators. In particular,
beside eigenfunctions φξ(x), theMξ has an infinite set of other eigenfunctions
corresponding to the eigenvalue λ = |ξ|p(= pk for some k = 0,±1,±2, ...).
Each λ = pk, k = 0,±1,±2, ... corresponds to an infinite series of eigen-
functions (distinct from the free mental wave φξ(x)) belonging to L2(Q, dx).
9
These eigenfunctions are well localized (concentrated in balls) in the mental
configuration space.
9We remark that free mental waves φξ(x) are so called generalized eigenfunctions. They
are not square integrable. Thus they do not belong to the space of quantum-like mental
states H = L2(Q, dx). One could speculate that such non-normalizable free mental waves
may be related to altered consciousness events such as e.g. hallucinations.
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This is very natural from the mental point of view. It would be quite
strange if the only quantum-like mental state with the fixed motivation mag-
nitude is the state φξ characterized by totally indefinite distribution of mental
states q. By intuitive reasons there must be quantum-like mental states char-
acterized by the fixed Mξ = λ that are concentrated on a special class of
mental states (a kind of special mental activity).
One of the most important distinguishing features of quantum-like mental
theory is that the motivation magnitude operatorMξ has a discrete spectrum
(except of one point, see further considerations). Hence the magnitude of the
motivation does not change continuously.
There exists only one point of the spectrum of the operatorMξ that is not
its eigenvalue: λ = 0. It is the limit point of the eigenvalues λk = p
k, k →∞.
There is no eigenfunction φ0 belonging to the state space H. Thus our model
brain could not be (alive, awake?) in the stationary quantum-like mental
state having the motivation of zero magnitude.
Another distinguishing feature is infinite degeneration of spectrum. This
purely mathematical result can have important implications for the problem
of correspondence between mental and physical worlds. In fact, due to this
huge degeneration, we could not uniquely determine the mental state of a
cognitive system by fixing the motivation magnitude Mξ.
6 Neuron-activation observable
As we have already discussed, we could not introduce a mental state observ-
able q. However, in the same way as for the motivation we can introduce an
operator of the p-adic magnitude of a mental state:
Mqφ(x) = |x|pφ(x).
Spectral properties of this operator are similar to spectral properties of the
operator Mξ : discreteness and infinite degeneration of spectrum. Eigenfunc-
tions of Mq (belonging to H = L2(Q, dx)) are localized in p-adic balls–trees.
Therefore:
There exist stationary states of Mq that are characterized by activation of
the fixed tree of mental states.
Unfortunately, Mq could not be used to fix such a tree (as a consequence
of infinite degeneration of spectrum).
The operators of position and motivation magnitudes, Mξ and Mq, do
not commute (as operators of position and momentum in ordinary quantum
mechanics):
[Mq,Mξ] =MqMξ −MξMq = hJ,
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where J 6= 0 is an integral operator [45]. Thus we get a mental uncertainty
relation, compare to [32]:
For any quantum-like mental state φ, it is impossible to measure motiva-
tion and position magnitudes with an arbitrary precision.
By measuring the motivation magnitudes we change position magnitudes
and vice versa. This can also be expressed mathematically by using the p-
adic Fourier transform. We denote by Ωr(x) the characteristic function of
the ball Br(0) (it equals to 1 on the ball and 0 outside the ball). We have
[45], p. 102, Ω˜r(ξ) =
1
r
Ω 1
r
(ξ). If the state of mind is concentrated on the
ball-tree Br(0), then motivations are concentrated on the ball-tree B 1
r
(0).
As in the case of the Mξ-observable, the point λ = 0 belongs to a non
discrete spectrum of theMq observable. Thus there is no stationary quantum-
like mental state φ corresponding to zero magnitude of q. A cognitive system
is not alive (awake?) in such a state.
To understand better the mental meaning of the Mq-observable, it is
useful to consider a new mental observable:
A = − logpMq.
If, φ ∈ H is an eigenstate of the Mq corresponding to the eigenvalue λ =
|q|p = 1pk , then φ also is an eigenstate of A corresponding to the eigenvalue
µ = k and vice versa. Thus the discrete part of the A-spectrum coincides
with the set of integers Z. The A gives the position of the igniting neuron in a
layer of neurons. It is called neuron-activation observable. We note that there
is an interesting relation between neuron-activation observable and entropy.
Let us consider the quantum-like state φ(q) =
√
(p+ 1)|q|pΩ1(q). Here√
p+ 1 is just the normalization constant. The corresponding probability
distribution P(q) = (p+1)|q|p on the tree Zp and equals to zero outside this
tree. The entropy of this probability distribution
EP = −
∫
Zp
logpP(q)P(q)dq =< A >φ − logp(p+ 1).
7 Complex cognitive systems; evolution
We now consider a cognitive system consisting of n hierarchic layers of neu-
rons. It can be an individual brain as well as a system of brains. The mental
space of this cognitive system is
Q = Qp × · · ·Qp
(n times). For each mental coordinate qj , j = 1, 2, ..., n, we introduce the
motivation magnitude operator Mj = hDj, where Dj is Vladimirov operator
for qj . We introduce kinetic mental energy (free energy of motivations) as
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H = h2∆,
where ∆ =
∑n
j=1D
2
j is Vladimirovian (a p-adic analogue of the Laplacian).
We note that free mental waves φξ(x) = e(hξx) are eigenfunctions of
this operator with eigenvalues λ = |ξ|2p. As in the cases of the Mq, Mξ-
observables, there is an infinite family of other eigenfunctions distinct from
free mental waves. These functions are localized on the mental configuration
space (describing fixed ranges of ideas). The spectrum is discrete : λ =
pk, k = 0,±1,±2. Thus the kinetic mental energy is changed only by jumps.
The λ = 0 is the only point that belongs to the non discrete spectrum of the
operator of the kinetic mental energy.
Interactions between brain’s layers as well as interactions with the exter-
nal world are described by the operator of the potential mental energy. It
is given by a real valued function (potential) V (q1, ..., qn). The total mental
energy is represented by the operator:
H = h2∆+ V.
We note that a mental potential V (q1, ..., qn) can change crucially spectral
properties of the mental energy observable. If V depends only on p-adic
magnitudes |qj|p of mental coordinates and V → ∞, |qj|p → ∞, and V
is bounded from below (e.g. nonnegative), then the spectrum of H (that
is discrete) has only finite degeneration. Thus the ”state of mind” of a
free cognitive system could not be determined by fixing the mental energy.
However, by using additional mental (information) potentials we could (at
least in principle) do this.
The ground mental energy state λ0 is not degenerated at all. In the
latter case by fixing the minimal value of the mental energy H = λ0 we can
determine the ”state of mind”, namely the λ0-eigenstate. Even for other
eigenvalues we can try to determine the ”state of mind” if the degeneration
of spectrum is not so large. It is interesting to remark that mathematical
results [45] imply that degeneration of eigenvalues (distinct from the ground
energy) increases (as p2) with increasing of p. If we connect the complexity of
a cognitive system with the coding base p, then we obtain that, for complex
cognitive systems (e.g. p = 1999), it is practically impossible to determine
the ”state of mind” corresponding to the fixed value of mental energy.
8 Entanglement of psychological functions
8.1. Classical viewpoint to localization of psychological functions.
The problem of neural localization of psychological functions split the neuro-
physiological community, see e.g. A. R. Damasio [53]:“One held that psycho-
logical functions such as language or memory could never be traced to a particular
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region of brain. If one had to accept, reluctantly, that the brain did produce the
mind, it did so as a whole and not as a collection of parts with special functions.
The other camp held that, on the contrary, the brain did have specialized parts
and those pars generate separate mind functions.” Both adherents of whole-
ness and localization of psychological functions have a lot of experimental
evidences supporting their views. A kind of peaceful unification of these
two views to localization of psychological functions is given by our model
of coding of cognitive information by hierarchic pathways activity. As each
pathway N is hierarchic, there are a few neurons in the pathway that play
the most important role. Their location in some domain U of the brain de-
termines localization of a psychological function containing N . However, N
goes throughout many other brain (and body) regions. So U -localization is
only a kind of fuzzy localization.
However, I do not think that this is the end of the localization story.
We suppose that cognition involves not only classical dynamics of neural
networks, but also quantum-like processing described by the evolution of
quantum-like wave function, see section 9. The latter gives the amplitude
of probability distribution of realization of classical mental states (hierar-
chic strings of e.g. frequencies of firings). Such a quantum-like processing
of cognitive information would automatically create psychological functions
that do not have even fuzzy localization. Such functions are induced via
entanglement of localized psychological functions.
8.2. Entanglement. Let U1, ..., Uk be some neural structures – ensem-
bles of hierarchic neural pathways – specialized for performing psychological
functions F1, ..., Fk. Consider corresponding Hilbert spaces of quantum-like
mental states: Hj = L2(Qj , dxj), where Qj = Qpnj and dxj is the Haar
measure on Qj . Let eFj be the orthonormal basis in Hj corresponding to the
function Fj .
Let us consider the Hilbert space of quantum-like mental states of the
composite neural system, U = U1∪ ...∪Uk : H = L2(Q, dx), where Q = Q1×
...×Qk. Here a normalized state φ(q1, ..., qk) gives the amplitude of probability
that U1 produces q1,..., Uk produces qk. We consider in H the orthonormal
basis e obtained as the tensor product of bases eFj . The e describes a mental
representation corresponding to the psychological function F = (F1, ..., Fk)
produced by classical combination of psychological functions F1, ..., Fk. Let us
now consider some other basis e˜ containing nontrivial linear combinations of
vectors of the e. This basis gives the mental representation of a psychological
functionG that could not be reduced to classical combination of psychological
functions Fj. We call G an entanglement of psychological functions Fj. Of
course, G is produced by the collection U of neural structures Uj . But G
arises as nontrivial quantum-like combination of psychological functions Fj .
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We remark that entanglement of psychological functions has nothing to
do with entanglement of quantum states of individual micro systems in the
brain (compare to conventional reductionist quantum models of brain func-
tioning). Entanglement of psychological functions is entanglement of proba-
bilistic amplitudes for information states of macroscopic neural systems, see
section 10 for further discussion.
9 State-evolution
We want to describe the evolution of a quantum-like mental state (mental
wave function) φ(t, x). The first natural and rather nontrivial problem is the
choice of the evolution parameter t. This problem was discussed in detail in
[32]. It was shown that there are different natural possibilities to describe
the evolution of mental states: ”mental time”, ”psychological time” as well
as ordinary physical time evolution, see also section 10. In this paper we
consider the evolution with respect to physical time t belonging to the real
line R. To derive the evolutional equation for φ(t, x), we proceed in the same
way as Schro¨dinger in ordinary quantum mechanics. We start with a free
mental wave φξ(x) = e(hξx), ξ, x ∈ Qp. We have:
H0φξ(x) = |ξ|2pφξ(x), where H0 = h2D2 is the operator of the mental
energy for a free system.
The φξ(x) is a stationary state corresponding to mental energy E = |ξ|2p.
Such a wave evolves as
φξ(t, x) = e
iEt
h φξ(x).
We note that this function is a combination of two essentially different
exponents: ordinary exponent and p-adic character. This function satisfies
to the evolutional equation:
ih
∂φ
∂t
(t, x) = h2D2φ(t, x). (5)
This is Schro¨dinger’s mental equation for a free cognitive system. If we
introduce a mental potential V (x), then we get general Schro¨dinger’s mental
equation:
ih
∂φ
∂t
(t, x) = h2D2φ(t, x) + V (x)φ(t, x). (6)
If the initial quantum-like state ψ(x) = φ(0, x) is known, then by using (6)
we can find φ(t, x) at each instant t of physical time. Under quite general
conditions [45], the operator H = h2D2 + V (x) is a self-adjoint operator.
Therefore (6) is the standard Schro¨dinger’s equation in the Hilbert space H
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for one rather special class of operators H. There also are mathematical re-
sults on analytical properties of solutions and correctness of Cauchy problem
[47].
Remark 9.1. (Bohmian theory) We can try to develop an analogue of
Bohmian (pilot wave) approach. As in ordinary Bohmian mechanics, we can define
a quantum-like mental potential
Wφ(t, x) = −h
2
R
D2R,where R(t, x) = |φ(t, x)|. (7)
This potential has the same properties as the ordinary quantum potential: (a)
Wφ(t, x) does not depend on the absolute magnitude of φ; (b) Wφ(t, x) depends on
the second variation of the magnitude of φ. However, (in the opposite to ordinary
Bohmian mechanics) we could not describe evolution of an individual mental state
(position) q(t) by using Newton’s equation with additional potential W. At first
glance, this is a purely mathematical difficulty. But I think that this mathematical
fact has deep cognitive meaning, namely that the dynamics of quantum-like state
φ(t, x) does not determine the dynamics of classical mental states. Very different
flows of classical mental states (hierarchically ordered neural flows) can produce
the same wave φ(t, x). In our model only this wave determines results of mental
measurements. Thus (in our model) it seems to be impossible to find a one to
one correspondence between mental behaviour and neural activity. The flow of
consciousness does not uniquely correspond to neural dynamics in the brain.
10 Discussion
10.1. Why quantum-like formalism? One of the main reasons to ex-
pect that mental observables (including mental self-observables) should be
described by the quantum-like (Hilbert space probabilistic) formalism is the
very high sensivity of neural structures to changes of contexts of measure-
ment. Such a sensivity implies the violation of rules of classical probabilistic
calculus and induces a so called quantum probabilistic calculus, see [33], [35]
for the detailed analysis. The main distinguishing feature of this quantum
probabilistic calculus is interference of probabilities of alternatives. There-
fore a quantum-like structure of mental observables should imply interference
effects for such observables. In [65] a general scheme of mental measurements
was proposed that could be used to find the interference effect. It may be
that the corresponding statistical data have already been collected some-
where. We need only to extract the interference effect.
Another reason for quantum-like considerations is the discrete structure
of information processing in brain. It is natural to describe this exchange
by quanta of information by a quantum-like formalism. In particular, in
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our model we automatically obtained that basic mental observables such as
e.g. mental energy have discrete spectra. We underline that philosophy of
organism of Alfred Whitehead was one of the first philosophic doctrines in
that fundamental proto-mental elements of reality, namely actual occations,
had quantum (in the sense of discreteness) structure. The philosophy of
organism was based on one-substance cosmology, see [1], p. 26, “Descartes
and Locke maintained a two-substance ontology – Descartes explicitly, Locke by
implication. Descartes, the mathematical physicists, emphasized his account to
of corporeal substance; and Locke, the physician and the sociologist, confined
himself to an account of mental substance. The philosophy of organism, in its
scheme for one type of actual entities, adopts the view that Locke’s account of
mental substance embodies, in a very special form, a more penetrating philosophic
description than Descartes’ account of corporeal substance.”
10.2. Quantum-like statistical behaviour and consciousness. In
our model of consciousness as the process of (quantum-like) self-measurements
over hierarchic neural structures the quantum structure plays an important,
but not determining role. There are many sensitive physical systems (not
only microscopic, but also macroscopic) that could exhibit quantum-like be-
haviour, see [33]-[35] for the details. Thus to be quantum-like is not the
sufficient condition to be conscious. There must be something else that is
crucial in inducing consciousness. This consciousness determining factor may
be quantum as well as classical (or a very special combination of classical and
quantum factors).
It seems that the crucial point might be the ability to “feel” the ensemble
probability distribution of information strings produced by neural activity.
My conjecture is that such a feeling is the basis of mentality. In such a
model a cognitive system reacts not to firings of individual neurons or even
large populations of neurons, but to integral probability distributions
of firings. If this is the really the case, then quantum-like probabilistic
formalism would appear automatically, since this is the most general theory
of transformations of context depending probabilities [35]-[39].
10.3. Why p-adic space? On the classical level the main distinguishing
feature of our model is the ultrametric p-adic structure of the classical mental
space. As we have already mentioned in section 3, ulrametricity is simply a
topological representation of hierarchy. Hence, the main classical feature of
the model is its very special hierarchic structure. I think that the presence
of such a hierarchic structure is the very important condition of cognition
and consciousness. In principle, it is possible to consider general ultrametric
cognitive models. I restrict myself to consideration of p-adic models, since
there is the possibility to connect p-adic hierarchic model with frequency
domain models.
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However, the presence of the p-adic hierarchy is not sufficient to induce
consciousness (nor even cognition). For example, spin glasses have hierarchic
structures that in some cases could also be mathematically described by p-
adic numbers, see [62], [63]. The crucial point may be a complex system of
interconnections between the huge ensemble of hierarchic neural structures
in brain.
10.4. Individual and ensemble interpretations The large diversity
of physical interpretations of the mathematical formalism of quantum me-
chanics is one of many serious problems in quantum foundations. Different
interpretations provide totally different views to physical reality (including
the absence of such a reality at all), see e.g. [10]-[12], [15].
As a consequence of the great success of the books of R. Penrose on
the quantum approach to mind, neurophysiologists, psychologists, cognitive
scientists, and philosophers are now quite familiar with one very special in-
terpretation, namely Penrose’s quantum gravity improvement of the conven-
tional interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The first question is: Why does the conventional interpretation need some
improvements at all?
This was well explained in book [15].10 Conventional quantum theory
with the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation has many problems including
numerous mysteries and paradoxes (e.g. [15], p. 237: ... yet it contains many
mysteries. ... it provides us with a very strange view of the world indeed.”; or R.
Feynman: “It is all mysterious. And the more you look at it the more mysterious
it seems.”).
Unfortunately, all these mysteries and paradoxes related to the inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics were automatically transmited to cognitive
sciences. Some people enjoy this and they are happy to speak about men-
tal nonlocality or mental collapse. It is the general attitude to couple the
mystery of consciousness with some still unclear aspects of interpretation of
quantum mechanics. On the other hand, many realistically thinking neu-
rophysiologists, psychologists, cognitive scietists, and philosophers dislike to
use all such tricky quantum things as superposition of (e.g. position) states
for an individual system, collapse, nonlocality, death of reality in the cogni-
tive framework. I strongly suupport this viewpoint.11
10Neurophysiologists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers are lucky that
R. Penrose does not support orthodox views to quantum theory. So in his books [14], [15]
this theory was not presented in the rigid orthodox form.
11Of course, discussing all these intriguing problems of interpretation of quantum me-
chanics we should not forget that (as it was mentioned by one of referee’s of this paper):
“The interpretation of the formalism is, in the end, largely irrelevant to the description of
the phenomena under observation or the mathematics used to treat them.”
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There is no any possibility to go deeply into foundations of conventional
quantum theory. I think that the crucial point is the individual interpreta-
tion of a wave function. The wave function is associated with an individual
quantum system (in the orthodox approach – it gives the complete descrip-
tion). For example, the individual interpretation induces such a mysterious
thing as superposition (e.g. position) states for an individual system. On
the other hand, individual superposition immediately implies that “Quantum
theory provides a superb description of physical reality on a small scale...”, [15],
p.237. As the superposition of states for individual macroscopic objects (e.g.
cars) was never observed, conventional quantum theory should be applied on
so called quantum scale. In particular, all cognitive models based on con-
ventional quantum theory should go deeply beyond the macroscopic neural
level, see [15], p.355: “It is hard to see how one could usefully consider a quan-
tum superposition consisting of one neuron firing, and simultaneously not firing.”
Therefore all such models suffer of the huge gap between quantum micro and
neural macro scales. Of course, there are various attempts to solve these
problem. For example, in [15] it was proposed to use quantum coherence
to produce some macro states by coherence of large ensembles of quantum
systems.
Finally, we mention the quantum gravity improvement of conventional
quantum theory, [14], [15]. This is really an improvement and not a cardinal
change of conventional quantum ideology. It is an attempt to explain reduc-
tion as “gravitationally induced state-vector reduction.” It would not be useful
to discuss the role of such an improvement of physical theory in a biological
journal. However, for cognitive models, the use of quantum gravity argu-
ments looks as just increasing of conventional quantum mystifcation. There
is a new huge gap between quantum scale and Planck scale (10−33 cm). It is
even less belivable that the mind is induced by superpositions of mass states.
Quantum-like approach to cognitive modeling used in this paper is based
on so called ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics, see e.g. L. Bal-
lentine [11]. By this interpretation (that was strongly supported by A. Ein-
stein) a wave function is associated not with an individual physical system,
but with a statistical ensemble of systems. The statistical approach has its
advantages and disadvantages. In particular, there is no mystery of state
reduction. Individual systems are not in superposition of different states.
Superposition of wave functions is a purely statistical property of various
ensembles of physical systems. One of the main problems of the statistical
approach was the impossibility to get interference of probabilities on the ba-
sis of classical ensemble probability. Recently it was done in author’s works
[33]-[36] by taking into account context dependence of probabilities. The ab-
sence of the mysterious superposition for individual systems and operation
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with ensembles gives the possibility to apply the Hilbert space probabilsitic
formalism, quantum-like theory, to ensembles of macroscopic systems. We
agree with R. Penrose that an individual neuron could not be in superposition
of two states, but two ensembles of neurons (as well as the same ensemble at
distinct moments) could demonstrate features of superposition.
10.5. Neural code and structure of mental space. Suppose that
the coding system of a cognitive system is based on a frequency code. There
exists an interval of physical time ∆ such that a classical mental state (mental
position) produced by a hierarchic chain of neurons is a sequence with co-
ordinates given by numbers of oscillations for corresponding neurons during
the interval ∆. This ∆ depends on a cognitive system and even on a psycho-
logical function inside the same brain, namely ∆ = ∆τ,F . Thus in our model
the problem of the neural code is closely related to the problem of time-
scaling in neural systems. For different ∆, we get different coding systems,
and, consequently, different structures of mental spaces. The corresponding
natural number p that determines the p-adic structure on the mental space
is defined as the maximal number of oscillations that could be performed by
neurons (in hierarchic chains of neurons working for some fixed psychological
function) for the time interval ∆. The coding that is based on e.g. the 2-adic
system induces the 2-adic mental space that differs crucially from the 5-adic
(or 1997-adic) mental space induced by the 5-adic (or 1997-adic) system. As
it was remarked in section 3, by changing the p-adic structure we change
crucially dynamics. Hence, the right choice of the time scaling parameter
∆ and corresponding p = p∆ plays the important role in the creation of an
adequate mathematical model for functioning of a psychological function.
10.6. Mental time. There might be some connection between the
time scale parameter ∆ of neural coding and mental time. There are strong
experimental evidences, see e.g. K. Mogi [66], that a moment in mental time
correlates with ≈ 100 ms of physical time for neural activity. In such a model
the basic assumption is that the physical time required for the transmission
of information over synapses is somehow neglected in the mental time. A
moment in mental time is subserved by neural activities in different brain
regions at different physical times.
10.7. Quantum-like models with p-adic valued functions. A se-
ries of works of the author and his collaborators, see, for example, [47],
developed the formalism of quantum mechanics in which not only the clas-
sical configuration space, but also wave functions are p-adic. Originally this
formalism was developed for high energy physics, namely, for theory of p-
adic strings. Later I used this formalism for cognitive modeling, see e.g.
paper [29] on p-adic cognitive pilot wave model (“conscious field model”)
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giving the very special realization of Bohm-Hiley-Pylkka¨nen ideas on active
information. From the mathematical point of view the p-adic valued formal-
ism looks more attractive than the complex valued formalism developed by
Vladimirov and Volovich, see e.g. [45]. In particular, here operators of men-
tal position and motivation are well defined. However, there is a difficulty
that induces strong prejudice against this p-adic valued formalism, namely
the appearence of p-adic valued probablities. Despite very successful math-
ematical development of the theory with p-adic valued probabilities [47], it
is clear that we cannot use it for ordinary measurements over physical and
cognitive systems. In such measurements we always observe ordinary prob-
abilities. Thus p-adic valued quantum-like formalism could not be used to
describe traditional mental measurements over a cognitive system performed
by external systems. As it was pointed out in [32], such p-adic probabilities
(stabilization of frequencies in p-adic topology and chaotic behaviour of these
frequencies in ordinary real topology) might appear in anomalous phenom-
ena. In principle, such probabilities might be related to the functioning of
consciousness. It might be that consciousness uses self-measurements follow-
ing to p-adic valued quantum-like theory. However, in the present paper we
would not like to study such a model of consciousness.
Finally, we mention the fundamental work of M. Pitka¨nen [67] that also
contains a p-adic model of consciousness. However, M. Pitka¨nen used an
orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (state reduction,
superposition of states for individual quantum systems and so on). Another
fundamental aspect of his approach is the proposal to formulate space-time
geometry by using both real and p-adic space-time regions.
10.8. Real and p-adic spaces. At first glance, in our model there is
no direct connection between real continuous space that is traditionally used
to describe classical states of material objects and p-adic hierarchic (tree-
like) spaces that was proposed to decribe classical mental states of brain. So
we follow to Descaurtes doctrine. Such an approach was strongly critisized
from many sides. In particular, such a theory is not coherent, see Whitehead
[1]. Of course, it would be nice to develop some classical and corresponding
quantum-like models based on real/p-adic space. The real and p-adic parts of
material–mental space would describe the physical brain and “mental brain”,
respectively. Our first point is that, in general, we could not work with the
fixed p-adic structure. As we have already discussed, different cognitive sys-
tems and psychological functions can be based on different p-adic mental
spaces. Thus in a general model we have to use all p-adic spaces simulta-
neously. We remark that a mathematical topological structure unifying real
and all p-adic numbers (for prime p) is well known. This is so called adelic
space, see [45] on physical models over adels. The next natural step would
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be to apply adelic quantum-like formalism to measurements over material
and cognitive systems. In adelic quantum-like model “the disastrous sepa-
ration of body and mind, characteristic of philosophical systems which are
in any important respect derived from Cartesianism” (see [1], p.348) could
be avoided, since adelic amplitudes would depend both on body (real) and
mind (p-adic) variables.
10.9. Microtubules. Are neurons really the basic elements for hier-
archic mental coding? At the moment there is strong neurophysiological
evidences that this is really the case. Nevertheless, we should not totally re-
ject other possibilities. In particular, over the last 20 years S. Hameroff and
his collaborators, see e.g. [68], have been developing a model of conscious-
ness based on quantum processes in microtubules. Hameroff’s approach is
a traditional quantum reductionst approach. Thus our paper has nothing
to do with it. However, the general idea that microtubules play an im-
portant role in information processing in brain should be considered very
seriously in a quantum-like approach. Of course, in such a model the main
role would be played by hierarchic organization of microtubules on a classi-
cal level. Quantum-like formalism can be used to describe the corresponding
mental amplitude. Finally, we mention some other fundamental papers on
the quantum brain [69]-[71].
10.10. Non-reductionism. The basic question of all quantum reduc-
tionst models of consciousness is “How is it that consciousness can arise from
such seemingly unpromising ingredients as matter, space, and time? – [15], p.
419. In our model, consciousness has no direct relation to matter. It is a fea-
ture of very special hierarchic configuration of information described by the
mental amplitude φ(x). By answering to Penrose’s question “The physical phe-
nomenon of consciousness?”, [15], p.406, I say: “Consciousness is a bio-physical
as well as a bio-information phenomenon.”
10.11. Quantative measure of consciousness. I was extremely fac-
sinated by Baars’ idea to consider consciousness as a variable [72]. The main
problem is to find some numerical representation of such a consciousness-
variable. In our model, such a variable should be in some way connected
with the basic probability distribution P (t, x) = |φ(t, x)|2. This is the proba-
bility that the concrete hierarchic configuration of firings (e.g. configuration
of frequencies) is realized in brain at the moment t. Hence, if sufficiently many
hierarchic chains of neurons produce x, then P (t, x) is sufficiently large. The
value of P (t, x) by itself cannot be taken as a quantative measure of mental-
ity.
For instance, suppose that P (t, x) ≡ 1 for all x. This is the uniform dis-
tribution on the p-adic space. We could not expect that such an amplitude
with uniform activation of all classical mental states corresponds to a high
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level of mentality.12 Conscious behaviour corresponds to a mixture of various
motivations. Such a mixture is characterized by variation of the probability
distribution P (t, x). I propose the following numerical measure of conscious-
ness (at mental state φ(t, x)) :
Mconsciousness =
∫
Qp
(|DxP (t, x)|2 + |∂P (t, x)
∂t
|2)dx
10.12. Neural groups. The fundamental role that internally organized
groups of neurons (and not individual neurons) play in processing of infor-
mation in brain was discussed in details in Edelman’s theory of neural groups
selection (TNGS), [73]. Our model in that neural pathways are used as the
neural (classical) basis for processing of information in brain is closely related
to TNGS. Of course, we understand that our model may be oversimplified.
It may that the basic units should be not chains, but whole trees of neurons.
10.13. Does consciousness benefit from long neural pathways?
Finally, we discuss one of the greatest mysteries of neuroanatomy, see, for
example, [17], [52]-[54], [73], [15]. It seems that in the process of neural
evolution cognitive systems tried to create for each psychological function
neural pathways that are as long as possible. This mystery might be ex-
plained on the basis of our neural pathway coding model. If such a coding
be really the case, then a cognitive system τ gets great benefits by extend-
ing neural pathways for some psychological function as long as possible. For
example, let the neural code basis p = 5 and a psychological function F is
based on very short pathways of the length L = 2. Then the correspond-
ing mental space contains N(5, 2) = 25 = 32 points. Let now p = 5 and
L = 10000. Then the corresponding mental space contains huge number of
points N(5, 10000) = 1020 points. On the latter (huge) mental space mental
amplitudes having essentially more complex behaviour (and, consequently,
the measure of consciousness) can be realized. It might be that this men-
tal space extending argument can be used to explain spatial separation of
various maps in the brain, see e.g. Edelman [73].
Summary
The crucial difference between my model and other classical as well as quan-
tum models of cognition is the use of the p-adic configuration space, mental space,
instead of a (traditionally used) continuous real physical space. This is a kind of
information model of brain (even on the ‘classical level’). However, we could not
12In particular, the free mental wave φξ(x) induces such a probability distribution.
In such a state a cognitive system has the fixed motivation ξ. By proceeding with a
fixed motivation (aim, task) a cognitive system τ performs not conscious, but merely
AI-behaviour (for example, realization of a program given by the string of digits ξ).
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say that there exist two totally different worlds – mental and physical. Connection
with physical space is performed via the use of the special topology, namely the
ulrametric p-adic topology. In fact, the use of the concrete number system, p-adic
numbers, is not so important. It is just the simplest (but, of course, very impor-
tant) model in that the special spatial structure, namely hierarchic treelike struc-
ture (e.g., hierarchic neuronal structures that generate the hierarchic frequency
coding of cognitive information), is represented by an ultrametric topological
space. Once we did such a transition from the physical space to an ultrametric
space, we can forget (at least at the first stage of modelling) about physical space
and work in the ultrametric mental space. We understand well that at the mo-
ment our fundamental postulate on ultrametric topology of information brain has
only indirect confirmations in neurophysiology and psychology, namely hierarchic
processing of cognitive information, see e.g. [17],[52]-[54],[72], [73]. In principle, on
the basis of hierarchy we could reconstruct the corresponding ultrametric topology.
However, the problem of creating of the detailed map of hierarchic structures in
brain is far from its solution. Therefore, it is quite natural to try to start simulation
with the simplest ultrametric space – the p-adic one.
The next crucial step is the use of the quantum-like formalism to describe
mathematically the process of thinking in that brain operates with probability
distributions. Here a mental state is mathematically described by a probability
distribution. This formalism is based on the standard quantum probabilistic cal-
culus in a Hilbert space. However, in the opposite to orthodox quantum views,
a quantum state (normalized vector belonging to a Hilbert space) describes not
an individual microscopic quantum system (e.g., an electron), but a statistical
ensemble of macroscopic neuronal structures.13
We need not consider superposition of states for an individual neuronal system.
Thus there is no problem with interpretation of such a superposition. Nevertheless,
a quantum-like brain is able to produce interference of mental states – complex
amplitudes of various ensemble distributions.
Our model can be called a model of probabilistic quantum-like thinking
on the ultrametric space of hierarchic neuronal pathways.
Main results of this paper were presented in author’s talk and poster at
the Conferences “Toward a Science of Consciousness” in Sho¨vde, Sweden
(2001), and Arizona (2002), [74].
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13Thus our model differs crucially from quantum cognitive models making possible
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